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I. INTRODUCTION 
International commercial arbitration rests on certain fundamental 
attributes that cut across the different rule sets and cultural and legal 
systems in which it operates. There is common ground that any 
international commercial arbitration regime must encompass integrity 
and fairness, uphold the legitimate expectations of commercial 
parties, and respect essential elements of due process such as equal 
treatment of the parties, a fair opportunity for each party to present its 
case and neutral adjudicatory proceedings, untainted by illegal 
conduct.1   
The system and its integrity depend substantially on the role of 
the arbitrator.  As Professor Rogers has stated: [T]he authoritative 
nature of adjudicatory outcomes, as well as their existence within a 
larger system, imposes on adjudicators an obligation to preserve the 
integrity and legitimacy of the adjudicatory system in which they 
operate.2 Cyberbreaches of the arbitral process, including intrusion 
                                                 
1. See e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB., art. 18 (1985) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Model Law], (“The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be 
given a full opportunity of presenting his case.”); Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(1)(b) (1958) (party inability to present case is 
grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement of an award); ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT 1, § 
33 (1996) (general duty of tribunal); LONDON CT. OF INT'L ARB., LCIA ARBITRATION RULES 
(2014) [hereinafter LCIA RULES] art. 14.4 (conduct of proceedings); William Park, Arbitrators 
and Accuracy, 1 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 43, note 89 (2010) (arbitrators rejecting 
complicity with money laundering, fake arbitrations, and other illicit schemes.); LEADING 
ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 485 (Lawrence W. Newman & 
Richard D. Hill eds., 3d ed., 2014); Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, Due Process Paranoia 
and the Procedural Judgment Rule: a Safe Harbour for Procedural Management Decisions by 
International Arbitrators, 32 (3) ARB. INT’L 415 (2016). 
2. CATHERINE ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 283 (2014). 
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into arbitration-related data and transmissions, pose a direct and 
serious threat to the integrity and legitimacy of the process.3 This 
article posits that the arbitrator, as the presiding actor, has an 
important, front-line duty to avoid intrusion into the process. 
The focus here on cyberintrusion into the arbitral process does 
not imply that international arbitration is uniquely vulnerable to data 
breaches, but only that international arbitration proceedings are not 
immune to increasingly pervasive cyberattacks against corporations, 
law firms, government agencies and officials and other custodians of 
large electronic data sets of sensitive information. 4 Similarly, our 
focus on the role and responsibilities of the arbitrator should not 
obscure that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility and that other 
actors have independent obligations. 5  Arbitrators are not uniquely 
vulnerable to data breaches and are not guarantors of cybersecurity.6 
In the highly interdependent landscape of international commercial 
arbitration, data associated with any arbitration matter will only be as 
secure as the weakest link. Since data security ultimately depends on 
the responsible conduct and vigilance of individuals, any individual 
                                                 
3 . Though we focus primarily on the threat of data breaches, the analysis here is 
generally applicable to other forms of unauthorized digital intrusion in proceedings, such as 
surreptitious surveillance of a hearing or of arbitration counsel in their offices, or the 
inadvertent recording and disclosure of an otherwise private conversation between members of 
the tribunal. 
4.   See infra Part II. 
5. Most notably, counsel have ethical duties to protect client confidentiality and to keep 
abreast of the risks and benefits of technology related to their practice. Further, all actors in the 
process may have contractual or regulatory obligations to protect sensitive personal or 
commercial information. See infra Sections III.A and III.C. 
6 . High profile examples of arbitration-related cyberattacks or data breaches have 
involved arbitral institutions, counsel, and parties as targets. See Zachary Zagger, Hackers 
Target Anti-Doping, Appeals Bodies Amid Olympics, LAW360.COM, (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/827962/hackers-target-anti-doping-appeals-bodies-amid-
olympics (reporting that hackers attempted to infiltrate the website of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport during the Rio Olympic Games); Alison Ross, Tribunal Rules on Admissibility of 
Hacked Kazakh Emails, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV., (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034787/tribunal-rules-on-admissibility-of-hacked-
kazakh-emails (reporting that privileged e-mails between a government and its arbitration 
counsel were disclosed by hackers of the government’s internal network); Alison Ross, 
Cybersecurity and Confidentiality Shocks for PCA, GLOBAL ARBITRATION REV., (July 23, 
2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034637/cybersecurity-and-confidentiality-
shocks-for-the-pca (reporting that the Permanent Court of Arbitration website was hacked 
during a hearing of China-Philippines arbitration and counsel in a Russia-related arbitration 
received “Trojan downloaders” that, if opened, would have enabled hackers to listen in on 
conversations). 
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actor can be that weak link, whatever their practice setting, whatever 
the infrastructure they rely upon, and whatever role they play in an 
arbitration.7 
We explore in Part II the threat that cybersecurity breaches pose 
to international commercial arbitrations, using some examples of 
high-profile breaches that already have occurred.8 We analyze in Part 
III the obligations that underpin the arbitrator’s duty to avoid 
intrusion. That duty, in our view, need not be created anew. Rather, it 
rests securely on well-established duties of arbitrators to safeguard 
both the confidentiality and the legitimacy and integrity of 
proceedings, as well as to be competent to handle each individual 
matter. 9  In an era of significant cyberthreats to the international 
commercial arbitration process, the duty to avoid intrusion is an 
inherent duty that follows as a matter of necessity from these earlier 
identified duties. 
We then discuss, in Part IV, the nature and scope of the 
arbitrator’s duty to avoid intrusion, which is bounded and fulfilled by 
taking reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized digital access to 
arbitration-related information. There is no bright line list of measures 
that will fulfill the duty. Rather, assessment of the cybersecurity 
necessary in international commercial arbitration is an ongoing, risk-
                                                 
7. The impact of individual conduct on cybersecurity has been highlighted in recent high 
profile security breaches. See, e.g., Gregory Krieg & Tal Kopan, Is This the Email That 
Hacked John Podesta’s Account?, CNN (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/28/
politics/phishing-email-hack-john-podesta-hillary-clinton-wikileaks/index.html; Eric Lipton, et 
al., The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the United States, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 13, 2016),  http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc
.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share; Tom Vanden Brook & Michael 
Winter, Hackers Penetrated Pentagon E-mail, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/06/russia-reportedly-hacks-pentagon-
email-system/31228625; Tom Fox-Brewster, Sony Needed to Have Basic Digital Protection. It 
Failed, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2014/dec/21/sony-hacking-north-korea-cyber-security. 
8. Although the focus of this article is on international commercial arbitration, many of 
the considerations discussed here will apply as well in investor-state and public international 
arbitration. Notably, some of the high profile data security breaches discussed in this article 
occurred in those contexts. See supra note 6. At the same time, however, there may be 
important differences between the scope of the arbitrator’s duty to avoid intrusion in the two 
regimes owing to the public interest in investor-state arbitration and initiatives to increase 
transparency in the settlement of investor-state disputes. See, e.g., UN Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (2015). 
9. See William Park, The Four Musketeers of Arbitral Duty: Neither One-For-All No All-
For-One, 8 ICC DOSSIERS 24 (2011). 
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based process that requires all participating individuals to understand 
data security threats in context. As threats evolve, participants must 
know their own digital architecture and security vulnerabilities 
(including those that arise from their personal day-to-day work habits) 
in order to implement protective measures responsive to the threats 
that apply to their data landscape and individual matters. 
The specific protective measures required to satisfy the duty will 
depend on an analysis of the security risks and on the measures that 
are practically available, as both will undoubtedly evolve from time to 
time. They will also depend upon considerations of convenience, cost 
and efficiency, as the arbitrator may need to balance the duty to avoid 
intrusion against other duties, including the duty to conduct 
proceedings in an expeditious and cost-effective manner10 and, in the 
absence of overriding considerations, consistent with the parties’ 
choices.11  
Finally, in Part V, we address some practical considerations for 
arbitrators as they determine what measures to implement to avoid 
intrusion and, in Part VI, suggest for future dialogue some ways in 
which all participants in the international commercial arbitration 
system may collaborate to address the ongoing threats. The 
fundamentals of effective cybersecurity management are accessible 
and not unduly burdensome. The arbitrator who keeps abreast of risks 
and benefits of technology in the arbitration process, is conscious of 
his or her digital assets and infrastructure, and who implements 
                                                 
10 . See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE [ICC], RULES OF ARBITRATION (2017) 
[hereinafter ICC RULES], art. 22(1) (tribunal shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration 
in an expeditious and cost-effective manner); INT'L CTR. FOR DISP. RES., INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2014) [hereinafter 
ICDR RULES], art. 20(2) (“The tribunal shall conduct the proceedings with a view to 
expediting the resolution of the dispute”); LCIA RULES, supra note 1, at art. 14.4(ii) 
(tribunal’s general duty to adopt suitable procedures, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, 
so as to provide a fair and efficient means for the final resolution of the parties’ dispute). 
11. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 34(2)(a)(iv) (award may be 
set aside if “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement, unless 
such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot 
derogate”); LCIA RULES, supra note 1, at art. 14.2 (“The parties may agree on joint proposals 
for the conduct of their arbitration for consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal. They are 
encouraged to do so in consultation with the Arbitral Tribunal and consistent with the Arbitral 
Tribunal's general duties . . .”); ICDR RULES, supra note 10, at 1 (rules apply “subject to 
modifications that the parties may adopt in writing” except that “where any rule[] is in conflict 
with any provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot 
derogate, that provision shall prevail”). 
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reasonable protective measures, will readily meet the obligation to 
avoid intrusion. 
II. DATA SECURITY THREATS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
Cyberintrusion, or hacking as it is more commonly known, is 
often in the news in respect to geo-politics12 and major corporate and 
government records data breaches.13 Law firms, too, are increasingly 
                                                 
12. See, e.g., U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Joint Analysis Report, GRIZZLY STEPPE-Russian Malicious Cyber Activity, JAR-
16-20296A (2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-2029 6A_
GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf (providing technical details regarding the tools and 
infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence services to compromise 
and exploit networks and endpoints associated with the US election); David E. Sanger & Mark 
Mazzetti, U.S. Had Cyberattack Plan if Nuclear Dispute Led to Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/middleeast/us-had-cyberattack-planned-if-
iran-nuclear-negotiations-failed.html;  
13. See, e.g., Vindu Goel and Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion Accounts Were 
Hacked, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/  technology/
yahoo-hack.html?_r=0 (stating that following a September 2016 disclosure that sensitive 
personal information associated with 500 million users was stolen in late 2014 in an apparently 
state-sponsored attack, Yahoo disclosed that a separate 2013 attack compromised more than 
one   billion users.); Kevin McCoy, Cyber Hack Got Access to Over 700,000 IRS Accounts, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/02/26/  cyber-hack-
gained-access-more-than-700000-irs-accounts/80992822/; James Billington, Hackers Carry 
Out $55M Cyber Heist From Boeing Aerospace Parts Manufacturer, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hackers-carry-out-55m-cyber-heist-boeing-aerospace-
parts-manufacturer-1540455; Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million Over Data 
Breaches, CNN (Dec. 2, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/companies/target-
data-breach-settlement/ (noting that the 2013 hack of Target database compromised roughly 
forty million customers); Julie Hirschfield Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 
21.5 Million People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/
office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html; Anna Wilde Mathews, 
Anthem: Hacked Database Included 78.8 Million People, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/anthem-hacked-database-included-78-8-million-people-
1424807364. See generally Verizon, 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report [hereinafter 
Verizon Report], http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2017) (analyzing a dataset provided by security service providers, law 
enforcement, and government agencies of more than 100,000 security incidents in 2015, 
revealing 3,141 confirmed data breaches in eighty-two countries); PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Key Findings from the Global State of Information Security Survey (2017), 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cyber-security/information-security-survey/assets/  gsiss-
report-cybersecurity-privacy-possibilities.pdf [hereinafter PWC Report]; Sarah Kuranda, New 
Federal Budget Proposal Raises Government Security Spending (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://www.crn.com/print/news/security/300079648/new-federal-budget-proposal-raises-
government-security-spending-ups-opportunity-for-vars.htm (referencing hacks of United 
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reported as having fallen victim to cyberattacks. 14   As awareness 
increases that corporations and players in the legal sector are 
attractive targets for cybercriminals, the multiple players involved in 
international private commercial arbitrations should realize that they 
too are vulnerable to cybercriminals. 15  International commercial 
arbitrations routinely involve sensitive commercial and personal 
information, including information that is not publicly available and 
that has a potential to move markets or impact competition. 
Conveniently for hackers, this information is culled together in large 
data sets, ranging from pleadings and documents produced in 
disclosure, documentary evidence, witness statements, expert reports, 
memorials, transcripts, attorney work product, tribunal deliberation 
materials, and case management data. As the multiple players 
involved often live in different countries, the information is frequently 
exchanged and stored in electronic form, making it vulnerable to 
malevolent outside actors. 
Data custodians, who hold sensitive data to varying degrees, 
include arbitral institutions, counsel, the parties and members of the 
arbitral tribunal (along with their respective support staff), as well as 
experts and vendors, including court reporters, translation services, 
couriers, and information technology (“IT”) professionals, among 
others. Hackers may attack individual actors directly16 or the digital 
                                                                                                             
States Office of Personnel Management records and email accounts of the Director of the CIA 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security). 
14. See, e.g., Nate Raymond, U.S. Accuses Chinese Citizens of Hacking Law Firms, 
INSIDER TRADING (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-insidertrading-
idUSKBN14G1D5; Michael Schmidt and Steven Lee Myers, Panama Law Firm’s Leaked 
Files Detail Offshore Accounts Tied to World Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/us/politics/leaked-documents-offshore-accounts-
putin.html (reporting that 11.5 million documents leaked from Panama law firm exposed the 
offshore accounts of 140 politicians and public officials). See also New York State Bar Ass’n 
Ethics Opinion 1019 (Aug. 2014) (“Cyber-security issues have continued to be a major 
concern for lawyers, as cyber-criminals have begun to target lawyers to access client 
information, including trade secrets, business plans and personal data.  Lawyers can no longer 
assume that their document systems are of no interest to cyber-crooks.”). 
15. For an overview of the major cyber risks in the practice of international arbitration 
and the tradecraft of the principal threat actors (hacktivists, state actors, and criminals), see 
James Pastore, Practical Approaches to Cybersecurity in Arbitration, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1023 (2017). See also Verizon Report, supra note 13. 
16. A prevalent method of attack that capitalizes on human error is ransomware, a form 
of malware frequently distributed through spear phishing e-mails sent to targeted individuals. 
The FBI explains: 
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infrastructure of their organizations.17  Moreover, each smartphone, 
tablet, laptop, thumb drive, other digital device, and cloud service 
used for the transmission or hosting of arbitration-related data offers a 
potential portal for unauthorized outsiders to gain access. 
The participants in international commercial arbitrations are, to a 
large degree, digitally interdependent, in that the process typically 
involves the transmission and hosting of data and collaborative 
elements such as communications relating to the arbitration. 
Consequently, any break in the custody of sensitive data has the 
potential to affect all participants. Indeed, since participants will 
frequently play host not only to their own sensitive data, but also to 
the sensitive data of others, intrusion into data held by one participant 
may injure another more than the one whose data security was 
compromised. 
Unauthorized access of sensitive data may result in the 
disclosure, or even acceptance into evidence of, illegally obtained, 
confidential, or privileged matter in ways that undermine fundamental 
elements of the adjudicatory process and its baseline due process 
elements.18 Disclosure of commercially sensitive information, trade 
                                                                                                             
[V]ictims—upon seeing an e-mail addressed to them—will open it and may click on 
an attachment that appears legitimate, like an invoice or an electronic fax, but which 
actually contains the malicious ransomware code. Or the e-mail might contain a 
legitimate-looking URL, but when a victim clicks on it, they are directed to a 
website that infects their computer with malicious software. Once the infection is 
present, the malware begins encrypting files and folders on local drives, any 
attached drives, backup drives, and potentially other computers on the same network 
that the victim computer is attached to. Users and organizations are generally not 
aware they have been infected until they can no longer access their data or until they 
begin to see computer messages advising them of the attack and demands for a 
ransom payment in exchange for a decryption key. 
FBI, Cyber Crime, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). 
17. In a July 2015 “watering hole” attack, for example, hackers implanted a malicious 
Adobe Flash file on the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s website that allowed them to infect 
the computer systems of website visitors who had not patched a known Adobe Flash security 
flaw. Luke Eric Peterson, Permanent Court of Arbitration Website Goes Offline, with Cyber-
Security Firm Contending that Security Flaw was Exploited in Concert with China-Philippines 
Arbitration, IA REP. (July 23, 2015), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/permanent-court-of-
arbitration-goes-offline-with-cyber-security-firm-contending-that-security-flaw-was-exploited-
in-lead-up-to-china-philippines-arbitration. 
18. See Alison Ross, Tribunal Rules on Admissibility of Hacked Kazakh Emails, GAR 
(Sept. 22, 2015) (reporting on unpublished order in Caratube International Oil Co. LLP and 
Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, admitting 
into evidence certain documents obtained from the public disclosure of documents hacked 
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secrets, or personal information may violate laws or contractual 
commitments in business-to-business or customer agreements, cause 
serious reputational and economic harm to individuals or 
businesses,19 trigger regulatory sanctions20 or negligence claims,21 and 
impact the integrity of public securities markets.22 Further, since the 
parties, counsel and arbitrators frequently reside in different countries 
and may be subject to differing data security law, privacy regimes and 
ethical standards, the legal effect of a data breach may be uncertain 
and complex.23 Last, and not least, data security breaches, particularly 
those resulting from a failure to implement reasonable security 
protocols, threaten to undermine public confidence in the very 
institution of international private commercial arbitration. We explore 
the latter consequence further below. 
 
III. SOURCES OF THE ARBITRATOR’S DUTY TO AVOID 
INTRUSION 
The arbitration rules, ethical codes, practice guidelines, and 
national laws that govern international commercial arbitration do not, 
by and large, establish an express duty for arbitrators or any other 
participant in the arbitral process to implement cybersecurity 
                                                                                                             
from Kazakhstan’s government computer network, yet excluding other documents on the basis 
of privilege). 
19 . See, e.g., Michael Cieply and Brooks Barnes, Sony Hacking Fallout Includes 
Unraveling of Relationships in Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/business/media/sony-attack-is-unraveling-relationships-
in-hollywood.html.  
20 . See, e.g., FINRA Fines Lincoln Financial Sub $650,000 for Cybersecurity 
Shortcomings, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/finra-
fines-lincoln-financial-sub-650000-cybersecurity-shortcomings. 
21. See, e.g., Robert Burnson, Yahoo’s Massive Data Breach Draws Negligence Suits by 
Users, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-
09-23/yahoo-s-massive-data-breach-draws-negligence-lawsuit-by-user; See also Shore et al. v. 
Johnson & Bell, Ltd., No. 1:16-cv-04363 (Verified Complaint) (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2016) (class 
action alleging a Chicago law firm was negligent and engaged in malpractice by using security 
practices that left client information vulnerable to hacking, including, for example, a ten year-
old time-entry system that had not been updated with security patches). 
22. Nate Raymond, U.S. Accuses Chinese Citizens of Hacking Law Firms, INSIDER 
TRADING (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-insidertrading-idUSK  
BN14G1D5 (reporting criminal charges for trading on confidential corporate information 
obtained by hacking into networks and servers of law firms working on mergers). 
23 . See Cybersecurity and Arbitration: Protecting Your Documents and Ensuring 
Confidentiality, NYSBA INSIDE (2016). 
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measures.24 Why, then, does the arbitrator bear responsibility to avoid 
cybersecurity breaches? In our view, the arbitrator’s duty to avoid 
intrusion rests on well-established arbitral duties: (i) the duty to 
protect the confidentiality and privacy of the proceedings, which will 
vary in different arbitrations, but exists to some degree in all 
proceedings; (ii) a fundamental duty to preserve and protect the 
integrity and legitimacy of the arbitral process; and (iii) a duty to be 
competent. In addition to these general duties, some arbitrators may 
have express or implied cybersecurity obligations by virtue of 
attorney codes of conduct, national data protection laws or 
regulations, or agreement with the parties. 
A. Duty of Confidentiality 
It is by now well-established that although parties generally have 
a right to keep international commercial arbitrations private (i.e., to 
exclude third parties from hearings),25 it cannot be assumed that they 
have a general duty or right to keep arbitration-related information 
confidential (i.e., to refrain from disclosing, and to keep others from 
disclosing, such information to third parties). 26  Arbitrators are on 
slightly different footing. Although applicable law, 27  governing 
                                                 
24. See Section III.C for a discussion of the ethical obligations of lawyers under the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which regulate attorney conduct. 
25. See Simon Crookenden, Who Should Decide Arbitration Confidentiality Issues? 25 
ARB. INT’L 603, 603 (2009) (“The privacy of arbitration proceedings is generally recognised 
internationally.”); see also, e.g., ICC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 26(3): (“ . . . Save with the 
approval of the arbitral tribunal and the parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall 
not be admitted.”); ICDR RULES, supra note 10, at art. 23(6) (“Hearings are private unless the 
parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary.”); LCIA RULES, supra note 1, at 
art. 19.4: (“All hearings shall be held in private, unless the parties agree otherwise in 
writing.”); SINGAPORE INT'L ARB. CTR., ARBITRATION RULES OF THE SINGAPORE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE (2016) [hereinafter SIAC RULES], art. 24.4 (“Unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, all meetings and hearings shall be in private, and any 
recordings, transcripts, or documents used in relation to the arbitral proceedings shall remain 
confidential.”). 
26. UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, ¶ 50 (2016) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Notes], (“there is no uniform approach in domestic laws or arbitration rules 
regarding the extent to which participants in an arbitration are under a duty to observe the 
confidentiality of information relating to the arbitral proceedings”); L. Yves Fortier, The 
Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB. INT’L 131 (1999); Leon 
Trakman, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 1 (2002). 
27 . More often than not, whether an arbitrator has a duty of confidentiality is not 
addressed by national legislation. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
2003 (Wolters Kluwer, 2d ed. 2014); see also Joshua Karton, A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a 
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arbitration rules,28 and party agreement may vary in the extent to 
which they obligate an arbitrator to keep all aspects of an arbitration 
proceeding confidential, it is uncontroversial that the arbitrator has a 
fundamental duty to keep at least certain aspects of a proceeding 
confidential. Gary Born takes a broad view of the confidentiality 
obligation, stemming from the arbitrator’s adjudicatory role: 
Even where confidentiality obligations are not imposed upon the 
parties by either their agreement or applicable national law, the 
arbitrators are subject to separate confidentiality obligations by 
virtue of their adjudicative function. One element of the 
arbitrator’s role is the duty to maintain the confidentiality of the 
parties’ written and oral submissions, evidence and other 
materials submitted in the arbitration. It is generally inconsistent 
with the arbitrator’s mandate to disclose materials from the 
arbitration to third parties.29 
The AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial 
Disputes is consistent with this view. Canon VI provides that “[a]n 
                                                                                                             
Way Forward on Publication of International Arbitral Awards, 28 ARB. INT’L 447, 450 
(2012). 
28. Although they differ in scope, most institutional international arbitration rules, with 
the notable exception of the ICC Rules, impose an express obligation of confidentiality on 
arbitrators. See, e.g., ICDR RULES, supra note 10, at art. 37(1) (“Confidential information 
disclosed during the arbitration by the parties or by witnesses shall not be divulged by an 
arbitrator . . . . [T]he members of the arbitral tribunal . . . shall keep confidential all matters 
relating to the arbitration or the award.”); LCIA RULES, supra note 1, at art. 30.2 (“The 
deliberations of the Arbitral Tribunal shall remain confidential to its members . . . .”); SIAC 
RULES, supra note 25, at art. 39.1 (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party and any 
arbitrator, including any Emergency Arbitrator . . . shall at all times treat all matters relating to 
the proceedings and the Award as confidential. The discussions and deliberations of the 
Tribunal shall be confidential.”), art. 39. 3 (“. . . matters relating to the proceedings” includes 
the existence of the proceedings, and the pleadings, evidence and other materials in the arbitral 
proceedings and all other documents produced by another party in the proceedings or the 
Award arising from the proceedings, but excludes any matter that is otherwise in the public 
domain”); JAMS FOUNDATION, JAMS INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2016), art. 17.1 
(“Unless otherwise required by law, or unless the parties expressly agree, the Tribunal, the 
Administrator and JAMS International will maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration.”), 
art. 17.2 (“Unless otherwise required by law, an award will remain confidential, unless all of 
the parties consent to its publication.”); INT'L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RES., CPR 
2014 RULES FOR ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (2014) 
[hereinafter CPR RULES], art. 20 (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties, the 
arbitrators and CPR shall treat the proceedings, any related disclosure and the decisions of the 
Tribunal, as confidential . . . .”). But see ICC RULES, supra note 10, at app. I, art. 6 (“The work 
of the [ICC] Court is of a confidential nature which must be respected by everyone who 
participates in that work in whatever capacity.”). 
29. BORN, supra note 27, at 2004. 
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arbitrator should be faithful to the relationship of trust and 
confidentiality inherent in that office.”30 In particular, the arbitrator 
has a duty to “keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration 
proceedings and decision” and “[i]n a proceeding in which there is 
more than one arbitrator, . . . [not to] inform anyone about the 
substance of the deliberations of the arbitrators.” 31   Less 
comprehensively, the IBA Rules of Ethics for Arbitrators specify that 
the “deliberations of the arbitral tribunal and the contents of the award 
itself, remain confidential in perpetuity unless the parties release the 
arbitrators from this obligation.”32 At the same time, however, they 
encapsulate a general duty of confidentiality by stating that arbitrators  
should be “discreet."33 
 
In contrast to arbitrators, who are thus bound by a duty of 
confidentiality,34 the parties themselves may not have a duty to keep 
                                                 
30. Similarly, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Code of Professional and Ethical 
Conduct for Members (Oct. 2009) provides: “A member shall abide by the relationship of trust 
which exists between those involved in the dispute and (unless otherwise agreed by all the 
parties, or permitted or required by applicable law), both during and after completion of the 
dispute resolution process, shall not disclose or use any confidential information acquired in 
the course of or for the purposes of the process.” CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, THE 
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL CONDUCT 
FOR MEMBERS (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter CIARB ETHICS CODE], Rule 8. 
31. AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Canon 
VI (B), (C). See also Canon I (I) (“An arbitrator who withdraws prior to the completion of the 
arbitration, whether upon the arbitrator’s initiative or upon the request of one or more of the 
parties, should take reasonable steps to protect the interests of the parties in the arbitration, 
including return of evidentiary materials and protection of confidentiality.”). 
32. INT'L BAR ASSOC., IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS, article 9. The IBA 
Rules of Ethics are not binding, but are deemed to reflect internationally acceptable guidelines 
developed by practicing lawyers from all continents. Id. at Introductory Note.  
33. Id. 
34. We note that while many arbitrators are lawyers and will have professional ethical 
obligations to preserve client confidentiality, by their terms, such obligations apply only when 
a lawyer is acting in a representative capacity for a client and not when serving as an arbitrator, 
who does not represent any party but has equal duties to all. BORN, supra note 27 at 1970; 
CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, Proposed New Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct Rule 4.5: The Lawyer as Third-Party Neutral (2002), Rule 4.5.2, 
comments [1], [3]. Nonetheless, to the extent that lawyers’ duties of confidentiality have been 
updated to take account of cyberthreats, analysis of those duties may inform how the 
international arbitrator should view the nature and scope of his or her duty to avoid intrusion. 
See, e.g., U.K. Information Commission Office, Monetary Penalty Notice under the Data 
Protection Act 1998, Supervisory Powers of the Information Commissioner (Mar. 10, 
2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2013678/mpn-data-breach-barrister-
20170316.pdf (fining UK family law barrister for failing to take “appropriate technical 
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arbitration proceedings or certain aspects of them confidential.  
Nonetheless, there is a common expectation among users of 
international commercial arbitration35 that the overall process will be 
confidential.36 More specifically, parties and institutions expect that 
the arbitrator will maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration.37 
                                                                                                             
measures against the unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data” in relation to 
confidential client files where the barrister failed to encrypt such files on her home computer 
and her husband inadvertently made the files accessible on an online directory while 
attempting to update software, noting that the Bar Council and barrister’s chambers had issued 
guidance to barristers that a computer used by family members or others may require 
encryption of files to prevent unauthorized access to confidential material by shared users). 
35. Notably, expectations of privacy and confidentiality may differ in investor-state 
arbitration. As explained in the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings: 
[t]he specific characteristics of investor-State arbitration arising under an investment 
treaty have prompted the development of transparency regimes for such arbitrations. 
The investment treaty under which the investor-State arbitration arises may include 
specific provisions on publication of documents, open hearings, and confidential or 
protected information. In addition, the applicable arbitration rules referred to in 
those investment treaties may contain specific provisions on transparency. Further, 
parties to a treaty-based arbitration may agree to apply certain transparency 
provisions. 
UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26, at  ¶ 55. 
36.  Paul D. Friedland, Arbitration Clauses for International Contracts 21 (Juris, 2d ed. 
2007) (“Notwithstanding the usual absence of prohibitions on party disclosure, there is an 
expectation and tradition of confidentiality in arbitration, which a party violates at its own peril 
vis-à-vis the arbitrators.”); Queen Mary Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l Arb., 2010 International 
Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration, at 29, http://www.whitecase.com/
files/upload/fileRepository/2010International_Arbitration_Survey_Choices_in_International_
Arbitration.pdf , 29 (Fifty percent of corporations indicated that they “consider that arbitration 
is confidential even where there is no specific clause to that effect in the arbitration rules … .or 
agreement”); Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Res., General Commentary for CPR Rules 
for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes, available at 
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/rules/international-other/arbitration/international-
administered-arbitration-rules (“Parties that choose arbitration over litigation of an 
international dispute do so primarily to avoid the unfamiliarity and uncertainty of litigation in a 
foreign court; also out of a need or desire for a proceeding that is confidential and relatively 
speedy.”); ICC International Court of Arbitration, Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the 
Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, ¶ 27 (July 13, 2016) (“The 
[ICC] Court endeavors to make the arbitration process more transparent in ways that do not 
compromise expectations of confidentiality that may be important to parties.”) 
37 . UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26, at ¶ 53 (“Whereas the obligation of 
confidentiality imposed on the parties and their counsel may vary with the circumstances of 
the case as well as the applicable arbitration law and arbitration rules, arbitrators are generally 
expected to keep the arbitral proceedings, including any information related to or obtained 
during those proceedings, confidential.”) (emphasis added); LCIA Notes for Arbitrators, ¶ 6 
(June 29, 2015) (“Parties to arbitrations are entitled to expect of the process a just, well-
reasoned and enforceable award. To that end, they are entitled to expect arbitrators: . . . to 
maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, in the adversarial and adjudicatory context, each actor in 
arbitration has legitimate expectations of privacy as to the data that 
defines or supports its role in the process. Irrespective of the extent to 
which the proceeding as a whole is entirely confidential or in some 
respects public, counsel and clients expect that they alone will have 
access to their communications and case strategy, for example, while 
arbitrators expect that no one else will have access to their 
deliberations or draft adjudicative documents and other work product. 
Those who intrude on these boundaries by hacking or other 
unauthorized access may break the law38; at a minimum, they will 
threaten legitimate expectations as to privacy in any adjudicatory 
process and the integrity of the process as a whole.  In sum, since 
cyberintrusion undermines or negates the legitimate expectations of 
confidentiality that exist in international commercial arbitration as 
well as the legitimate expectations of privacy that exist to some 
degree in all adjudicatory proceedings, it follows that the arbitrator’s 
special duty to protect confidentiality extends to an obligation to 
avoid intrusion by non-participants who are determined to defeat  
those expectations.39 
 
B. Duty to Preserve and Protect the Integrity and Legitimacy of the 
Arbitral Process 
The arbitrator’s duty to avoid intrusion also rests on a duty to 
protect the integrity and legitimacy of the arbitral process. 
Unauthorized intrusion by hackers or other malevolent actors 
threatens more than confidentiality: it is a direct threat to the fair, 
neutral, and orderly process that underlies all arbitrations and to 
public trust in the arbitral process. If we accept that hacking threatens 
the integrity of the process, it follows that the arbitrator’s obligation 
to protect the integrity of the process encompasses some form of duty 
to avoid such intrusion. 
                                                 
38. In the United States, for example, certain federal laws criminalize hacking and most 
states have computer crime laws that address unauthorized access. See Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; National Conference of State Legislatures, Computer Crime 
Statutes (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx. 
39. See UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26, at ¶ 58(b). 
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Our premise that the arbitrator has a duty to avoid intrusion does 
not require resolution of the ongoing debate as to whether a 
commercial arbitrator is a mere independent service provider to the 
parties or if the arbitrator has a broader, adjudicative role with 
responsibilities also to society and the rule of law.40 Recognizing the 
deference to party autonomy that characterizes international 
commercial arbitration, it is well-established that arbitrators also have 
important and independent responsibilities to maintain their own 
reputations and probity, to support the interests of society and to 
uphold the legitimacy and integrity of the arbitral process. 41 Even the 
most articulate and well-respected proponents of the arbitrator as 
service provider model recognize that there are limits to party 
autonomy and to arbitrators’ fidelity to the parties’ instructions. 42 
There is little doubt that the use in an arbitration of data illegally 
obtained by or on behalf of a party would irreparably taint 
                                                 
40. See ROGERS, supra note 2; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 392 (1978) (common features of the power to adjudicate delegated by the 
state to judges and by consent of the parties to arbitrators); Panel Discussion, Arbitrator Ethics 
Through the Lens of Arbitrator Role: Are Arbitrators Adjudicators or Service Providers?, 10 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 3, 309 (2016); Margaret Moses, The Role of the Arbitrator: 
Adjudicator or Service Provider?, 10 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 3, 367 (2016)  
41. See e.g., Julie Bédard, Timothy Nelson and Amanda Kalantirsky, Arbitrating in 
Good Faith and Protecting the Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 3 PARIS J. INT’L ARB. 737, 
749  (2010); ABA/AAA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COM. DISPUTES, Canon 1 
(“An arbitrator should uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process . . . . An 
arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the process of arbitration itself, 
and must observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and fairness of the process 
will be preserved.”); ICC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 5 (“[T]he emergency arbitrator shall act 
fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its 
case”); JAMS FOUNDATION, JAMS ARBITRATOR ETHICS GUIDELINES, 1 (“[A]n arbitrator 
should uphold the dignity and the integrity of the office of the arbitration process”); CIARB 
ETHICS CODE, supra note 30, at Part 2, Rule 2 (“A member shall maintain the integrity and  
fairness of the dispute resolution process.”). 
42. See Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Party Autonomy and the Rules Governing the 
Merits of the Dispute in Commercial Arbitration, in LIMITS TO PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 339 (Juris, 2016); see also Teresa Cheng, 
panelist, The Theory and Reality of the Arbitrator: What is an International Arbitrator? 7 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 4, 639 (2013) (commenting at the 25th Annual Workshop of the 
Institute for Transnational Arbitration that although arbitrators are independent service 
providers, there is also a duty to oneself as well as a duty to the arbitral process); ROGERS, 
supra note 2; ILA REPORT, infra note 47, at 17; Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, supra note 1, 
at n.59 (stating faithfulness to the agreement would not justify violation of international public 
policy.) 
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proceedings.43 Different issues arise when external actors compromise 
the data security of arbitration-related information. Here, the 
participants are victims of the intrusion and the matter presumably 
may proceed, with such corrective or ongoing protective steps as the 
tribunal may deem appropriate. 44  Nonetheless, such an incident, 
particularly if it follows from a failure to adequately secure data, 
inevitably will erode the confidence and trust of participants, and 
potentially the public, in the international private commercial 
arbitration process.45 The arbitrator, along with the parties, counsel, 
and other actors in the process, is in a position to take reasonable 
protective measures to avoid that risk. 
 While much attention has been focused on the implied powers 
of arbitrators to fill in gaps in institutional rules or the parties’ 
agreement where necessary to protect due process and the legitimacy 
of the process, less attention has been paid to the scope of the 
arbitrator’s duties.46  The ILA Arbitration Committee’s Final Report 
                                                 
43. ILA REPORT, infra note 47, at 18; Bernard Hanotiau, Misdeeds, Wrongful Conduct 
and Illegality in Arbitral Proceedings, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS, 285 (Kluwer Law International, 2003); REDFERN 
AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 5.76 (5th ed., 2009). 
44. See Caratube, supra note 18 (considering the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence, accepting some and excluding some). 
45 . See Jan Paulsson, Metaphors, Maxims and Other Mischief, The Freshfields 
Arbitration Lecture 2013, 30 ARB. INT’L 4, 630 (2014) (“[P]ublic confidence is perforce at 
stake in the arbitral context as well [as in the judicial process], because arbitration cannot 
thrive without the support of the general legal system.”); Charles Brower, Keynote Address: 
The Ethics of Arbitration: Perspectives from a Practicing International Arbitrator, 5 
BERKELEY J. OF INT’L L. PUBLICIST, 1 (2010) (“[A]rbitrators and arbitral institutions also have 
an interest in maintaining legitimacy, both for the mutual acceptance of their awards by the 
parties before them and for broad public acceptance of the entire law-based system of which 
they are a part.”). 
46. Two widely cited cases involving the appearance of new counsel after an ICSID 
tribunal was constituted focused on the arbitrator’s role in preserving the integrity of the 
arbitration proceedings. Although the tribunals reached differing results on applications to 
disqualify counsel and had differing views on the nature and extent of an arbitrator’s inherent 
powers, both stated that the arbitrators had some inherent power, and presumably some 
obligation, to protect the essential integrity of the proceeding. See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda 
d.d. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 15, (2008) (Tribunal’s Ruling 
Regarding the Participation of David Mildon QC in further Stages of the Proceeding); 
Rompetrol Group NV v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/03, 5-6 (2008) (Decision of the 
Tribunal on the Participation of a Counsel); see also Bédard, et al., supra note 41 at n.69. 
Similarly, in Caratube, although the tribunal found that the claimants failed to prove the 
respondent had engaged in any threatening or intimidating action that could cause an 
irreparable harm to the claimants’ rights in the arbitration, including a right to the “integrity 
and the legitimacy of the arbitration,” the tribunal implicitly recognized its authority to take 
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on The Inherent Powers of Arbitrator in International Commercial 
Arbitration noted that the implied powers necessary to protect the 
core functions of arbitration amount to affirmative arbitral duties: 
It is in such situations that a third and final category of non-
enumerated powers becomes relevant, encompassing that 
authority which can be said to be truly inherent, namely those 
powers necessary to safeguard a tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 
integrity of its proceedings. Stated differently, these powers are 
those required to decide a legal dispute fairly and in a manner 
consistent with at least the minimal requisites of due process and 
public policy. They trace their roots most clearly to the original 
notion of inherent powers as protecting jurisdiction and curtailing 
procedural abuses, and their exercise may justify overriding party 
preferences. . . . Such powers are so core to the function of 
arbitration that they might be more properly termed arbitral 
duties, the fulfillment of which is a necessary function of serving 
as a competent arbitrator.47 
We conclude, then, that the arbitrator’s duty to uphold the legitimacy 
and integrity of the arbitral process, and to ensure confidence and 
trust in arbitration, further supports the premise that the arbitrator has 
a duty to avoid intrusion. 
C. Duty of Competence 
It is commonly accepted that an arbitrator has a duty of 
competence. 48  Various arbitrator ethics codes expressly require 
arbitrators to be “competent.” Canon 1 of the ABA/AAA Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, which requires an 
arbitrator to uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration 
process, provides that an arbitrator should accept appointment in a 
                                                                                                             
measures to preserve the integrity of the arbitration insofar as it stressed the “[p]arties’ general 
duty, arising from the principle of good faith, not to take any action that may aggravate the 
present dispute, affect the integrity of the arbitration and the equality of the Parties . . . .” 
Caratube supra note 18, at ¶¶ 111, 154. 
47. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT FOR THE BIENNIAL CONFERENCE IN 
WASHINGTON, D.C., April 2014 (final report 2016) [hereinafter ILA REPORT], at 17, 
http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/04ED7050-5C2A-4A56-92FCF1857A094C8B 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2017). 
48. See Henry Gabriel and Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: 
Basic Principles and Emerging Standards, 5 WYO. L. REV 453 (2005); ILA REPORT, supra 
note 47 (stating the duty to protect integrity of the proceeding is core to necessary function of 
serving as a competent arbitrator). 
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particular matter only if fully satisfied that he or she is “competent to 
serve.” The IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators provide 
a more general requirement that “international arbitrators should be . . 
. competent” in addition to a specific requirement that the arbitrator 
be competent to determine the issues in dispute in a particular  
matter.49 
 
While the arbitrator ethics codes do not define competence, 
important context and definition of the meaning of the term may be 
drawn from the evolution of lawyer ethics codes in recent years. 
Recognizing the need to provide some definition of competence and 
to update ethical codes to reflect the rise of globalization and 
technology, governing bar associations and disciplinary authorities 
have amended lawyer ethical codes to provide explicit linkage 
between general competence requirements and the need to keep 
abreast of technology.50 For example, the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, first introduced by 
the ABA in 1983, and adopted over time in various forms by most 
states in the United States,51 provide the following lawyer competence 
requirement: 
Rule 1.1 Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
                                                 
49. See Introductory Note and Rule 2.2; see also CIARB ETHICS CODE, supra note 30, at 
Part 2, Rule 4 “Competence” (“A member shall accept an appointment or act only if 
appropriately qualified or experienced.”).  
50. Lawyer ethics rules obviously do not bind non-lawyer arbitrators. Indeed, some of 
the rules are limited to the context of client representation and thus do not expressly apply 
even to lawyers who, when serving as arbitrators, are not representing clients. For example, 
ABA Model Rule 1.1, standing alone in the form quoted in the accompanying text, does not 
apply directly to arbitrators, even if they are lawyers practicing in a jurisdiction where this 
version of the Model Rules applies. In France, the Règlement Intérieur National, the French 
code of ethics for lawyers, contains a general competency requirement in respect to client 
work in Article 1.3 (“L’avocat . . . fait preuve, à l’égard de ses clients, de competence . . . .”),  
http://codedeonto.avocatparis.org/acces-article; see also UK SOLICITORS REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY,  SRA CODE OF CONDUCT 2011 (Version 18, 2016) [hereinafter UK SRA CODE 
OF CONDUCT] at 0-1.5 (“[t]he service you provide to clients is competent . . . . ”), 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/code/content.page.  
51. A notable exception is California, which maintains its own Rules of Professional 
Conduct. California Rule 3-110 (A) provides a general competence requirement (“A member 
shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with 
competence.”). 
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skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation. 
Notably, ABA Model Rule 1.1 is limited by its terms to the lawyer 
serving in a representational function. However, the Preamble to the 
Model Rules notes that a lawyer may serve in other roles, including 
“as a third party neutral, a non-representational role helping the 
parties to resolve a dispute or other matter,” and goes on to state that, 
“[i]n all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt 
and diligent."52 
New York State did not adopt the Model Rules until 2009 and 
did not adopt the Preamble quoted above. However, Model Rule 1.1 
as adopted in New York added a more general competency 
requirement, in addition to the client-oriented rule: "A lawyer shall 
not handle a legal matter that the lawyer knows or should know that 
the lawyer is not competent to handle . . . .” 53 
Thus, at least as to lawyers working as arbitrators in jurisdictions that 
have adopted the ABA Preamble or who have adopted a rule similar 
to Rule 1.1(b) as in effect in New York State, there is a direct ethical 
obligation of competence.54From 2009 to 2013, the ABA Commission 
                                                 
52. AM. BAR. ASSOC., PREAMBLE: A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES, ¶4. By referring to 
“professional functions,” the Preamble is broad enough to avoid the debate over whether 
participants are engaged in the practice of law. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, 
P.C. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.4th 119 (Cal. 1998), cert den., 525 U.S. 920 (1998); Schiff 
Hardin LLP, Arbitration and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 13 ARIAS QUARTERLY U.S. 
1, 16-19 (2006), http://www.schiffhardin.com/Templates/Media/files/archive/binary/spector-
arbitration. pdf. 
53. NY Judiciary Law (Appendix: Code of Prof. Resp. §1200, Rule 1.1 (b)); The New 
York State Bar Association Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct (“COSAC”) 
2007 Report recommending the adoption of the Model Rules noted that the new rules were 
beneficial in describing competent representation as requiring the “legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation,” in contrast to the 
previous Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility that “did not define or describe 
competent representation.” New York State Bar Association Proposed Rules of Professional 
Conduct 11 (2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id
=26635; New York City Bar Association Professional Responsibility Committee Report on 
COSAC Proposals Rules 1.1-1.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5-3.9, and 8.1-8.4 (2006) available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Prof_Resp_COSAC_506.pdf (proposed Rule 1.1 “helpfully 
fleshes out the definition of ‘competent representation’”). Notably also, in adopting Model 
Rule 1.1 (b), New York State intended to preserve the concept in prior Disciplinary Rule 6-101 
(competent representation) and its accompanying Ethical Consideration 6-2 that a lawyer 
should attain and maintain competence by keeping abreast of current legal literature and 
developments. Id. 
54. Also useful by analogy is The Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the EU, issued by the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, which bridges the gap from the 
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on Ethics 20/20 recommended proposed amendments to the Model 
Rules to account for, among other things, rapid changes in technology 
affecting the practice of law. In 2012, the ABA House of Delegates 
adopted a revised Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1, to provide in respect 
to competency, that “to maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a 
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 
including the benefits and risks associated with technology.” In 
amending Comment 8, the ABA took the position that the revised 
language did not impose any new obligations on lawyers, but, rather, 
simply reminded lawyers that in the current environment, an 
awareness of technology, including the benefits and risks associated 
with it, is part of the lawyer’s general ethical duty to remain 
competent. 55  The same may be said in respect to an arbitrator’s 
competence obligation. 
In its 2014 report recommending that New York adopt the 
revised comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1, the New York State Bar 
Association Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct noted 
that: 
. . . to keep abreast of changes in law practice, a lawyer needs to 
understand the risks and benefits of technology relevant to the 
lawyer’s particular practice. For example, if a lawyer’s clients are 
communicating with the lawyer by web-based document-sharing 
technology or by social media, the lawyer should have some 
understanding of how to ensure that confidential communications 
remain confidential. The proposed amendment impresses upon 
lawyers the key role that technology plays in law practice and 
creates the expectation that lawyers will keep abreast of the 
                                                                                                             
regulation of lawyers working in a representational capacity in the judicial system to those 
working in arbitration by providing that “[t]he rules governing a lawyer’s relations with the 
courts apply also to his relations with arbitrators.” CCBE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002) at art. 4.5, available at 
http://www.idhae.org/pdf/code2002_en.pdf. 
55 . See Karin Jenson, Coleman Watson, & James Sherer, Ethics, Technology, and 
Attorney Competence, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/cle/materials/eDiscovery/
2014/frimorndocs/EthicsIneDiscoveryBakerHostetler.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2017); see also 
The State Bar Of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, 
Formal Opinion Interim No. 11-0004 (2014) (“An attorney’s obligations under the ethical duty 
of competence evolve as new technologies develop and become integrated with the practice of 
law.”); INT'L BAR ASSOC., IBA INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION (2011), http://www.ibanet.org/barassociations/BIC_resources.aspx (“Competence 
. . . includes competent and effective client, file and practice-management strategies.”).  
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benefits and risks associated with the technology relevant to their 
own legal practice.56 
Whether or not adopted in the form encompassing the more 
general obligation provided in the New York version of the rules, the 
Model Rules, and particularly Comment 8 to Model Rule 1.1 as it 
now reads, are relevant to inform and define the meaning of 
competence as applied to arbitrators, as well as in their direct 
regulation of lawyer conduct.57 
Achieving digital literacy, including an understanding of the 
measures reasonably necessary to avoid cyberintrusion in an 
arbitration, is also closely related to the attention institutions, users, 
and counsel have paid in recent years to the role of the arbitrator in 
                                                 
56 . Report of The New York State Bar Association Committee On Standards Of 
Attorney Conduct (“COSAC”) Proposed Amendments to the New York Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Related Comments 10 (2014), http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=54063.  
57. See, e.g., In re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.1 and 6-10.3, 
No. SC16-574 (Sept. 29, 2016), at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2016/sc16-
574.pdf (amending the comment to rule on competence to address technology); Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Technology Practice Management Guideline, Guideline 5.5 (“Competent Use 
of Information Technologies. Lawyers should have a reasonable understanding of the 
technologies used in their practice or should have access to someone who has such 
understanding”) & 5.10 (“Security Measures. Lawyers should be familiar with the security 
risks inherent in any of the information technologies used in their practices including 
unauthorized copying of electronic data, computer viruses which may destroy electronic 
information and hardware, hackers gaining access to lawyers’ electronic files, power failures 
and electronic storms resulting in damage to hardware or electronic information, theft of vast 
amounts of electronic information stored in stolen hardware. Lawyers should adopt adequate 
measures to protect against security threats and, if necessary, to replace hardware and 
reconstruct electronic information.”), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with
.aspx?id=2147491197 (last visited Jan. 22, 2017); Canadian Bar Association, Legal Ethics in a 
Digital World (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.cba.org/getattachment/Sections/Ethics-and-
Professional-Responsibility-Committee/Resources/Resources/2015/Legal-Ethics-in-a-Digital-
World/guidelines-eng.pdf; Philipe Doyle Gray, The Pillars of Digital Security, BAR NEWS: J. 
OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES BAR ASSOCIATION (Summer 2014), http://www. 
philippedoylegray.com/content/view/56/45/ (although the Law Society of New South Wales 
has not adopted professional conduct rules addressing technology, it has published guidelines 
for lawyers about the use of technology such as cloud computing and social media); E-Law 
Committee of the Law Society of South Africa, LSSA Guidelines on the Use of Internet-Based 
Technologies in Legal Practice (2014), www.lssa.org/za/index.php?; see also UK SRA CODE 
OF CONDUCT, supra note 50, at O-4.5 (“You have effective systems and controls in place to 
enable you to identify risks to client confidentiality . . . .”); O-7.5 (“You comply with . . . data 
protection legislation.”); IB-7.5 (“Identifying and monitoring . . . IT failures and abuses.”).  
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case management.58 In the highly digitized and interdependent world 
of international arbitration, management of technology and baseline 
data security competence manifestly have become critical 
components of an arbitrator’s competence to organize and conduct 
arbitration proceedings.59 
 
D. Global Data Protection Laws and Regulations 
In any given arbitration matter, data held by an arbitrator may be 
subject to specific cybersecurity obligations arising from international 
or national data protection laws and regulations that govern how 
certain information can be collected, stored, and transferred.60 While 
there is no universal international approach to data protection, nearly 
110 countries 61  have enacted laws aimed at protecting personal 
information by regulating categories of data or industry sectors, such 
as the financial and health care industries.62 As the key players in 
                                                 
58. See, e.g., ICC RULES, supra note 10, at app. IV (case management techniques); 
LCIA RULES, supra note 1, at art. 14 (conduct of the proceedings); ICDR RULES, supra note 
10, at art. 20.2 (conduct of the proceedings) (“In establishing procedures for the case, the 
tribunal and the parties may consider how technology, including electronic communications, 
could be used to increase the efficiency and economy of the proceedings.”); College of 
Commercial Arbitrators, Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration 
(2010) 69 (arbitrators should take control of the arbitration and actively manage it from start to 
finish); ICC Commission Report, Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration (2d. ed. 2012); 
Christopher Newmark, Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, in LEADING ARBITRATORS’ 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION supra note 1. 
59 . The UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (2016) urge that 
arbitrators consider issues relating to the means of communication to be used during the 
proceedings at the outset, noting that the parties and the tribunal “may need to consider issues 
of compatibility, storage, access, data security as well as related costs when selecting 
electronic means of communication.” UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 56, 58. 
60. See UNCTAD, Data Protection Regulations and International Data Flows: 
Implications for Trade and Development, UNCTAD/WEB/DTL/STICT/2016/1/iPub, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2016d1_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) 
(overview of international and national laws and regulations) (“UNCTAD on Data 
Protection”); see also European Union Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (implemented in 
each of the twenty-eight EU Member States through national data protection law). 
61. See UNCTAD on Data Protection at 42 (108 countries have either comprehensive 
data protection laws or partial data protection laws). 
62. In the United States, for example, there is no omnibus privacy or data protection 
legislation, but a patchwork of federal privacy laws that generally regulate security breach 
notification statutes by sector and state. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1301 passim [hereinafter HIPPA] (health information); 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (consumer protection); Gramm-Leach-
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international arbitrations frequently reside in different countries, 
resulting in continuous cross-border exchanges of information, it 
follows that the same data may be subject to multiple, and potentially 
inconsistent, laws. For example, the legal concept of “personal 
information” or “personally identifiable information” subject to 
reasonable protection from unauthorized access is defined more 
broadly under EU law than it is under US law.63 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to address the 
complex conflict-of-law issues that may arise in these situations,64 the 
global proliferation of data protection laws indicates that: (i) 
participants in international arbitrations who share the sensitive 
information of others may have legal obligations to ensure that 
arbitrators, acting in the capacity of service providers, safeguard that 
information by complying with certain security standards65; and (ii) 
increasingly, both participants and non-participants in an arbitration 
may have legally enforceable interests (or rights)66 in the way that 
arbitrators secure and handle e-mail correspondence, witness 
statements, 67  and other electronically-exchanged documents that 
routinely disclose personally identifiable information. Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (financial information); National Conference of State 
Legislators, Security Breach Notification Laws (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx (forty-seven states have enacted legislation entitling individuals to notice of 
breaches of information of personally identifiable information). 
63. See Practical Law, Expert Q&A on Data Security in Arbitration (Dec. 1, 2016) 
(stemming from the concept in EU countries that privacy is a fundamental human right, a 
person’s name and place of employment can be considered protected information). 
64. Although not the focus of this article, we note that the potential for the application of 
disparate data protection laws strongly favors early discussions between opposing counsel 
about how arbitration-related data will be handled as well as discussion of data security with 
the tribunal by at least the first case management conference. 
65. For example, an individual or organization that must comply with health information 
privacy rules under HIPPA is required to have any “business associate” it engages to help 
carry out its functions agree to comply with those rules as well. HIPPA, supra note 62. See 
also EU Directive 2016/1148 (July 6, 2016). 
66. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012/C 326/02), 
art. 7 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications”) & 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.”). 
67 . See INT'L BAR ASSOC., IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010), art. 4(5) (specifying personal information to be 
included in fact witness statements). 
1004 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
when security incidents occur, a web of breach notification 
obligations may be triggered.68 
Although it is not evident that the obligations or legal interests 
that may arise under the current global data protection regime create a 
bright-line duty, independent of any specific case, for arbitrators to 
avoid cyberintrusion, their prevalence at least supports the notion that 
to maintain user confidence in international arbitration process,  
arbitrators must not only be prepared and competent to handle 
sensitive information securely, but also appear to the public to be so 
prepared. Global data protection laws thus behoove arbitrators to be 
proactive (and not merely reactive, on a case-by-case basis) in dealing 
with cybersecurity. 
IV. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATOR’S DUTY TO 
AVOID INTRUSION 
This article posits that the arbitrator’s duty in relation to 
cybersecurity is one of avoiding intrusion, which we define as the 
duty to take reasonable measures to prevent unauthorized digital 
access to arbitration-related information. In the following sections, we 
first explore the nature and scope of the duty and then discuss some 
practical measures that will assist the arbitrator in fulfilling the duty. 
A. An Umbrella Obligation 
As we have shown above, the arbitrator’s duty in relation to 
cybersecurity is not a new, independent obligation, but rather a 
natural extension in the digital age of an arbitrator’s existing duties to 
keep arbitration-related information confidential, to preserve and 
protect the integrity and legitimacy of the arbitral process, and to be 
competent. By grouping the implied cybersecurity responsibilities 
arising under each of these duties under the new umbrella of the “duty 
to avoid intrusion,” we recognize the unique challenges that 
cyberthreats pose to the practice of international arbitration in the 
digital age. 
This is a matter of substance, not just terminology. Recognition 
of the threat and each actor’s acceptance of responsibility to take part 
in addressing it are key building blocks to effective cybersecurity in 
                                                 
68. Practical Law, supra note 63. 
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the international commercial arbitration regime. In this article, which 
focuses on the arbitrator’s role, we emphasize that the fulfillment of 
existing arbitrator duties in the digital age encompasses a duty to be 
proactive and vigilant in guarding against cyberintrusion. 
B. An Interdependent Landscape with Independent Duties 
Since the data arbitrators are entrusted to keep confidential 
generally originates in the arbitration from the parties and their 
counsel, it may be tempting for arbitrators to view cybersecurity as an 
issue for the parties, and particularly counsel, to address on a case-by-
case basis. Parties and their counsel indisputably do have legal and 
ethical responsibilities to safeguard the data that they import into an 
arbitration.69 In many instances, they will be uniquely positioned to 
secure that data and to advise the arbitrator regarding specific security 
precautions necessary in the case or required by law. Any view that 
purports to isolate any one particular participant in the arbitration 
process as having sole responsibility for cybersecurity, however, or to 
relieve the arbitrator from any responsibility for cybersecurity outside 
of the bounds of individual cases, ignores the interdependent digital 
landscape discussed above and is shortsighted. Since any break in the 
custody of sensitive data may affect all participants in the arbitral 
process, cybersecurity is an inherently shared responsibility. 
While interdependent with other actors, the arbitrator’s 
cybersecurity duty also stands alone. The arbitrator who takes the 
view that others are primarily responsible abjures the arbitrator’s 
special role as adjudicator as well as the arbitrator’s underlying duties 
to safeguard the integrity and legitimacy of the process and the 
confidentiality of arbitration-related information. The obligations of 
other players in the arbitral process (including the parties, counsel, 
arbitral institutions and third party service providers among others) 
may be governed by differing standards and other legal regimes, only 
some of which overlap with those governing arbitrators. 
Moreover, the arbitrator’s day-to-day data security architecture 
and practices pre-exist individual matters and persist after the matter 
is concluded. Thus, the strength of the arbitrator’s routine 
cybersecurity practices will impact the overall security of arbitration-
                                                 
69. See supra Section III.D (discussing national data protection laws and regulations); 
Section III.C (discussing cybersecurity obligations arising from attorney ethical codes). 
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related data from the first moment the arbitrator becomes involved 
with a case, before counsel or the parties have an opportunity to 
address security protocols that may be appropriate for the specific 
data involved in the matter, and will continue after the matter ends as 
the arbitrator maintains at least some data for conflicts or other 
record-keeping purposes. 
C. Personal Accountability 
As arbitrators are appointed for their personal qualifications and 
reputational standing, 70  it is broadly accepted in international 
arbitration that the arbitrator’s mandate is personal and cannot be 
delegated. 71  While this notion is raised most often in discussions 
about impermissible delegation of decision-making responsibilities to 
arbitral secretaries, the personal nature of the arbitrator’s mandate has 
implications for cybersecurity as well. In particular, it is important for 
arbitrators to recognize that even if the security of their digital 
infrastructure is established and monitored by IT personnel, or they 
work in a large law firm setting where they have little to no influence 
over firm-wide security policies, they cannot assume that their 
responsibilities in relation to cybersecurity have been met. 
 
First, effective security depends on individual choices and 
conduct. 72 Hackers’ most valuable currency is human carelessness.73 
                                                 
70. BORN, supra note 27, at 2013. (“Arbitrators are almost always selected because of 
their personal standing and reputation . . .”). 
71. See Eric Schwartz, The Rights and Duties of ICC Arbitrators, in ICC International 
Court of Arbitration Bulletin, Special Supplement, The Status of the Arbitrator (1995) at 86; 
see also BORN, supra note 27, at 1999. (“An arbitrator’s obligations include the duty not to 
delegate his or her responsibilities or tasks to third parties. … Most fundamentally, an 
arbitrator cannot delegate the duty of deciding a case, attending hearings or deliberations, or 
evaluating the parties’ submissions and evidence to others: these are the essence of the 
arbitrator’s adjudicative function and they are personal, non-delegable duties.”). 
72. To highlight the fundamental role played by individuals in protecting confidential 
information, whether reliance is placed on notepads, mobile telephones, or the cloud, Philipe 
Doyle Gray shares this anecdote: 
I regularly walk from the Supreme Court of New South Wales down King Street to 
stop at the intersection with Elizabeth Street. So too do other lawyers. When it’s 
raining we huddle under the awning of the Sydney University Law School, but in 
fine weather we gather around the traffic lights waiting for the signal that it’s safe 
for pedestrians to cross. Usually, I see paper files or lever-arch folders neatly stating 
the names of the clients concerned, and sometimes the nature of their confidential 
affairs. Often, I can’t help but overhear a colleague talking about his matter. A few 
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Even if an arbitrator operates in an environment with the digital 
architecture of Fort Knox, important security actions will always 
remain in the arbitrator’s personal control. Law firm or IT policy may 
dictate to an arbitrator, for example, that strong, complex passwords 
be used on all laptops and other devices and that passwords be 
changed regularly. However, an arbitrator risks completely 
undermining that security protocol by conveniently storing a reminder 
of the password du jour on a post-it note stuck to the cover of a 
laptop,74 and then working away on the laptop in an airport lounge or 
other public environment, or, worse, forgetting the laptop in the 
security line or the airplane seat pocket after a long international 
flight.75 Similarly, although IT policy may dictate that no USB drive 
can be used in a networked computer before it is manually scanned 
for viruses by the IT department, an arbitrator sitting in a hearing in 
Vienna may decide before the flight home to take the USB drive 
handed out at a recent arbitration conference and use it to transfer 
                                                                                                             
times, sensitive material was inadvertently broadcast to passers-by that happened to 
include me. Once, I even overheard a colleague—speaking on his mobile phone—
discuss settlement negotiations during a mediation that had adjourned over lunch: he 
openly discussed not only the parties’ respective offers, but his own client’s bottom 
line. The real security problems lie not in CLOUD COMPUTING, but in ourselves. 
Gray, supra note 57.  See also Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Case No. 
1:15cv00057 (W.D. Va., Feb. 9, 2017), http://bit.ly/2mSkyuu (court held that insurer’s 
attorney-client privilege was waived where entire claims file was loaded onto a cloud service 
and made accessible to anyone via hyperlink without password protection, stating this was the 
“cyber world equivalent of leaving its claims file on a bench in the public square”). 
73. In December 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported that “[w]eeks after J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co. was hit with a massive data breach that exposed information from 76 million 
households, the country’s biggest bank by assets sent a fake phishing email as a test to its more 
than 250,000 employees. Roughly 20% of them clicked on it, according to people familiar 
with the email.” Robin Sidel, Banks Battle Staffers’ Vulnerability to Hacks, WALL ST. J., 
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-weakest-link-in-banks-fight-against-hackers
-1450607401.  See Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Cyber Security Guide for Business, at 
8, ICC Doc. 450/1081-5 (2015) (“35% of security incidents are a result of human error rather 
than deliberate attacks. More than half of the remaining security incidents were the result of a 
deliberate attack that could have been avoided if people had handled information in a more 
secure manner.”). 
74. According to Verizon’s 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, “63% of confirmed 
data breaches involved weak, default or stolen passwords.” Verizon Report, supra note 13, at 
20. See also Fox-Brewster, supra note 7 (Sony hack revealed chief executive’s password was 
“guessable to any semi-skilled hacker” and that passwords to internal accounts were stored in a 
file marked “passwords”). 
75. Laptops and other devices are reportedly lost over 100 times more frequently than 
they are stolen. Verizon Report, supra note 13, at 44. 
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notes from deliberations stored on her laptop to a public computer in 
the hotel business center for printing. 
Second, there is danger in complacency. Arbitrators 
understandably want to spend time on the practice of arbitration, not 
on routine practice management. However, an arbitrator who 
dismisses cybersecurity as an “IT issue” and who assumes that 
“others are taking care of it” fails to appreciate how a failure to heed 
cybersecurity may undermine his or her ability to keep arbitration-
related information confidential as well as user trust and confidence in 
the integrity of the international arbitration regime. Notwithstanding 
the steady flow of news reports about cyberbreaches, it appears that 
“many [attorneys and law firms] are not using security measures that 
are viewed as basic by security professionals and are used more 
frequently in other businesses and professions.”76 Arbitrators who rely 
on IT personnel to support their practice should thus bear in mind that 
their existing data security framework and digital architecture may 
well require an upgrade or adaptation to the unique aspects of 
international arbitration. Indeed, just as an arbitrator should not 
entrust (but may be aided by) the conflicts department in his or her 
law firm to determine whether he or she is bound to make any 
disclosures in an arbitration,77 an arbitrator may be assisted by, but 
should not entrust, an IT department to fulfill the duty to avoid 
intrusion.78 
                                                 
76. David G. Ries, Security, ABA TECHREPORT 2016, 1-2, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/techreport/2016/security/security.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting 
on 2016 survey of attorneys and law firms about security incidents and safeguards). See also 
Matthew Goldstein, Citigroup Report Chides Law Firms for Silence on Hackings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1NkjfKo (In March 2015, Citigroup’s internal 
cyberintelligence team advised bank employees to be “mindful that digital security at many 
law firms, despite improvements, generally remains below the standards for other industries.”). 
77. See, e.g., Ometto v. ASA Bioenergy Holding A.G. et al., 12 Civ. 1328(JSR), 2013 
WL 174259 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013). 
78. The importance of “executive-level” attention to effective cyberrisk management is 
frequently emphasized by cybersecurity experts. See, e.g., ICC, Cyber Security Guide for 
Business, supra note 73, at 4 (2015); Tucker Bailey et al., Why Senior Leaders Are the Front 
Line Against Cyberattacks, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/why-senior-leaders-are-the-front-line-
against-cyberattacks. 
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D. Continuous and Evolving 
The duty to avoid intrusion is a continuous obligation, which is 
not limited in time. In part, this follows from the nature of the 
arbitrator’s duty of confidentiality. Since arbitrators may maintain 
digital information from their cases beyond the lifetime of an 
individual matter, ranging from case administration data (including as 
part of conflicts or billing systems), correspondence, procedural 
decisions, awards, and parties’ evidentiary submissions, parties and 
other participants have a reasonable expectation that arbitrators will 
continue to safeguard the confidentiality of such information once a 
case ends. 79  Furthermore, as we have discussed above, because 
arbitrators accept appointments in new matters with a digital 
architecture and certain security practices already in place, parties and 
other participants have a reasonable expectation that arbitrators will 
heed cybersecurity from the time of appointment (and necessarily 
before). 
The ongoing nature of the arbitrator’s duty to avoid intrusion 
also flows from the underlying duty to be competent. Because 
cyberthreats are constantly evolving alongside advancing technology, 
an arbitrator cannot take effective steps to avoid intrusion unless he or 
she keeps abreast of the changing nature and scope of cyberrisks. 
Otherwise, the arbitrator will not be in any position to analyze risks 
and weigh appropriate responses, including, for example, with respect 
to whether new or additional security measures may be warranted, 
what work-arounds might be acceptable when complying with an 
established security protocol proves to be impossible or impractical, 
or whether a new product or service is adequately secure. 
E. Bounded by Reasonableness 
Cybersecurity professionals routinely advise that in today’s 
environment of ever-escalating data breaches, there is no longer any 
question of if one’s digital infrastructure and data will be hacked, but 
                                                 
79 . Int’l Law Ass’n, Draft Report of the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration for the 2010 Hague Conference, Confidentiality in International Arbitration, at 18 
(2010), http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19 (although there is uncertainty 
regarding the duration of duties of confidentiality in arbitration, the “fact that the duty of 
confidentiality usually covers the award seems to point to an expectation that the regime of 
confidentiality should outlive the arbitral proceedings and that the obligations will not cease 
after the end of the arbitration.”). 
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only when.80 As a practical reality, it follows that the arbitrator cannot 
guarantee that arbitration-related information will remain safe from 
hackers, 81  but can only take steps to mitigate the risks of 
cyberintrusion. In LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) explained why 
“reasonableness,” assessed “in light of the sensitivity and volume of 
consumer information [a company] holds, the size and complexity of 
its business, and the cost of available tools to improve security and 
reduce vulnerabilities,” is an appropriate touchstone for determining 
whether a company has implemented appropriate data security 
measures: 
[The FTC] has made clear that it does not require perfect 
security; reasonable and appropriate security is a continuous 
process of assessing and addressing risks; there is no one-size-
fits-all data security program; and the mere fact that a breach 
occurred does not mean that a company has violated the law.82 
Notably, reasonableness, not perfection, also bounds the lawyer’s 
confidentiality duty under the ABA Model Rules to protect 
information relating to the representation of a client from 
unauthorized access.83 
                                                 
80. U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara recently made such a pronouncement in announcing 
criminal indictments of hackers who traded on confidential law firm information, saying, “This 
case of cyber meets securities fraud should serve as a wake-up call for law firms around the 
world: you are and will be targets of cyber hacking, because you have information valuable to 
would-be criminals.” Nate Raymond, U.S. Accuses Chinese Citizens of Hacking Law Firms, 
Insider Trading, REUTERS, (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-
insidertrading-idUSKBN14G1D5. See also, e.g., Verizon Report, supra note 13, at 3 (“No 
locale, industry or organization is bulletproof when it comes to the compromise of data.”); 
ICC, Cyber Security Guide for Business, supra note 73, at 10 (“Even the best protected 
enterprise will at some point experience an information security breach. We live in an 
environment where this is a question of when, not if.”). 
81. ICC, Cyber Security Guide for Business, supra note 73, at 4 (2015) (“[A]ll business 
managers including executives and directors must recognize that cyber risk management is an 
on-going process where no absolute security is, or will be, available.”). 
82 . LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016). 
California’s Attorney General notes in her Breach Report 2016 that “reasonable security” is 
the general standard for information security adopted not only in California but also the major 
United States federal data security laws and regulations. See infra, note 111. 
83. Model Rule 1.6(c) provides “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the 
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the 
representation of a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 
1983). (emphasis added) 
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A risk-based approach, bounded by reasonableness, is similarly 
appropriate as we examine the scope and boundaries of the 
arbitrator’s duty to avoid the ever-evolving threats of cyberintrusion 
in international commercial arbitration. It follows from the conclusion 
there is no one-size-fits-all data security program for consumer-facing 
corporations that there is no one-size fits-all data security program for 
international commercial arbitrators; any such program would risk 
obsolescence and fail to account for significant contextual 
differences. Furthermore, as Pastore argues, a de-contextualized 
approach to data security may be counterproductive “in that it over-
designates [sensitive] information (desensitizing practitioners to the 
truly critical information) and results in overly cumbersome processes 
for information that, in reality, needs little to no additional 
protections.”84 
In addition, a standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances is familiar in the law, particularly in areas where the 
facts and circumstances vary widely and evolve over time. The 
reasonableness approach enables consideration of the trade-offs that 
will sometimes exist between increased security measures and other 
interests.85 To the extent the arbitrator’s duty to avoid intrusion is in 
tension with other important values such as conducting the 
proceedings expeditiously and cost-effectively and in accordance with 
the parties’ preferences,86 arbitrators should be entitled to weigh all of 
the relevant circumstances to determine the correct balance. 87 
Arbitrators, institutions, users, and counsel should be able to 
understand and embrace such a standard for cybersecurity. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to limit the arbitrator’s duty to an 
obligation to take such measures to protect digital security as he or 
she deems reasonable in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, 
including developments in technology and evolving security risks, the 
arbitrator’s individual practice setting and digital architecture, the 
sensitivity of the data to be protected, and any party preferences or 
                                                 
84. Pastore, supra note 15. 
85. See generally Pastore, supra note 15. 
86. See supra note 10. 
87. The UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (2016) note that data 
security is but one factor to be considered when deciding whether to use electronic means of 
communication for proceedings.. Other factors to be considered may include compatibility, 
storage, access and related costs. See UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26. 
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other case-specific factors present in the matters over which the 
arbitrator presides. 
V. IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO AVOID INTRUSION 
In the absence of a detailed roadmap for data security, the 
challenge for international arbitrators is to determine what specific 
measures they should implement to avoid intrusion, in their own 
infrastructure and in arbitrations over which they preside, given that 
what constitutes “reasonable” measures will vary based on a risk 
assessment of the arbitrator’s individual digital architecture and data 
assets, the prevalent data security threats, available protective 
measures and, in relation to individual matters, case-specific factors.88 
Although it is by no means comprehensive, in this Part, we aim to 
highlight certain practical measures and general principles that are 
likely to be relevant for all international arbitrators, regardless of 
practice setting and individual risk profile.89 In doing so, we further 
aim to show that the fundamentals of effective cyberrisk management 
need not be overwhelming or unduly burdensome.  In addition, since 
cyberintrusion in the arbitral process can potentially arise from both 
intentional, targeted attacks on arbitral participants90  and from the 
                                                 
88. Security framework standards are generally directed at organizations rather than 
business professionals. See generally NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SPECIAL 
PUBLICATION 800-53 REVISION 4, SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR FEDERAL 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2013); FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2014), available at www.nist.gov; 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information 
Technology, Security Techniques, Code of Practice for Information Security Controls, 
available at www.iso.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2017); Center for Internet Security, Critical 
Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, Version 6 (Oct. 15, 2015), www.cisecurity.org/. 
89. A recent working paper from the Washington Legal Foundation suggests eight data 
security best practices based on an analysis of FTC enforcement actions: 
 Limit the collection, retention, and use of sensitive data; 
 Restrict access to sensitive data; 
 Implement robust authentication procedures; 
 Store and transmit sensitive information securely; 
 Implement procedures to identify and address vulnerabilities; 
 Develop and test new products and services with privacy and security in mind; 
 Require service providers to implement appropriate security measures; 
 Properly secure documents, media, and devices. 
Kurt Wimmer, Ashden Fein, Catlin M. Meade & Andrew Vaden, Data Security Best 
Practices Derived From Ftc § 5 Enforcement Actions, at 6  (Washington Legal Foundation  
Paper No. 199, 2017). 
90. See supra notes 13-14. 
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inadvertent 91  disclosure or compromise of arbitration-related 
information (e.g., by way of a weak password, lost mobile device, or 
other human error),92 we discuss below potential responses to external 
threats and safeguards to prevent or mitigate damage if data security 
is_compromised.   
 
A. Keeping Abreast of Developments in Relevant Technology and 
Understanding Associated Benefits and Risks 
There are readily accessible resources for arbitrators to educate 
themselves as to the evolving nature and scope of major data security 
threats, with a view to understanding the significance and 
effectiveness of specific security protocols, such as standards for 
passwords. These resources have been developed by bar associations, 
law firms, and others.93  For example, the ABA has taken the lead 
internationally in developing guidance for legal practitioners in 
responding to the challenges of the digital world and regularly posts 
short, digestible articles online on topics such as ransomware and 
encryption, in addition to offering educational webinars and 
seminars.94 Such resources frequently highlight ethical opinions from 
state bar associations on the responsible use of technology in the legal 
                                                 
91 . Even a single misdirected e-mail—within an arbitration proceeding—can have 
serious consequences for the perceived integrity and legitimacy of proceedings. In Horndom 
Ltd. v. White Sail Shipping, Optima Shipping and Integral Petroleum (SCC Arbitration 
V094/2011), the respondents challenged their own appointee to the tribunal after he 
accidentally copied one of the parties’ lawyers on an e-mail complaining that counsel were 
getting “above their station” and that he was “rather sick of these parties.” While the arbitrator 
admitted that disagreement over the hearing date resulted in his “frustration with procedural 
matters” and “intemperate expression,” according to the respondents, the inadvertent 
disclosure of this otherwise private exchange among tribunal members revealed the arbitrator’s 
“personal animosity” toward counsel and raised justifiable doubts about his impartiality. See 
also Alison Ross, Accidental cc Triggers Double Arbitrator Challenge in Stockholm, GLOB. 
ARB. REV. (Oct. 17, 2016), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1069329/accidental-cc-
triggers-double-arbitrator-challenge-in-stockholm. 
92. An episode of the popular CBS TV show The Good Wife was based on the disclosure 
of confidential information resulting from an open feed when a video camera was mistakenly 
left on after a teleconferenced deposition. THE GOOD WIFE, (CBS, 2014), http://www.cbs.com/
shows/the_good_wife/episodes/213197/. 
93. See, e.g., supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
94. Law Technology Resource Center, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resource
s.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
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profession. One particularly noteworthy resource, available only to 
ABA members, are e-mail alerts from the FBI about evolving 
cyberrisks and threats targeting law firms. 
Other bar associations worldwide, such as the Law Society of 
Upper Canada, also have developed helpful online resources.95 For 
the most part, such resources are available for free online (i.e., to 
members and non-members alike) and can assist arbitrators in finding 
quick, practical answers to technical questions written for legal 
professionals (such as what are the risks of public wifi and what 
alternatives are available for mobile wifi access).  Meanwhile, to keep 
a handle on evolving data protection obligations internationally, now 
that most major law firms have a dedicated data privacy or 
cybersecurity practice group, arbitrators may also find it helpful to 
sign up for e-mail alerts from several law firms based in different 
jurisdictions. 
B. Implementing Baseline Security 
Cybersecurity experts agree that good cyber “hygiene”—basic 
everyday habits relating to technological use—is essential to a strong, 
baseline defense.96 Significantly, these are habits that every arbitrator, 
regardless of practice setting, can readily implement, with minimal 
cost and without the need for IT support. Basic cyber hygiene best 
practices include: 
 creating access controls, including strong, complex 
passwords97 and two-factor authentication when available98; 
                                                 
95. See Technology Practice Tips, LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/technology-practice-tips-podcasts-list/ (podcasts on “everything you 
ever wanted to know about technology, but were afraid to ask” including “[p]ractical and 
important information about passwords, encryption, social media, smartphone security, 
websites and much more . . . in an accessible, conversational manner.”). 
96. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS, 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FTC CASES (June 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf; Wimmer et. al., supra note 89. 
97 . On some devices, including many phones and tablets, biometric authentication 
technologies such as fingerprint scanners now are available to perform the authentication and 
access control function. See PWC Report, supra note 13, at 9-12. 
98. Many services and sites that store sensitive information, including cloud storage and 
e-mail providers, offer two-factor authentication whereby access requires a password plus 
something else that you have; typically, a security code that is either sent by text message or e-
mail to a separate device or generated via an app that works offline such as Google 
Authenticator, or a biometric like a fingerprint. See Two-Factor Authentication for AppleID, 
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 guarding digital “perimeters” with firewalls, antivirus and 
antispyware software, operating system updates and other 
software patches99; 
 adopting secure protocols such as encryption for the storage 
and transmission of sensitive data100; 
 being mindful of public internet use in hotel lobbies, airports, 
coffee shops, and elsewhere and considering making use of 
personal cellular hotspots and virtual private networks101; and 
 being mindful of what one downloads.102 
C. Taking a Thoughtful Approach to Assets and Architecture 
As Pastore explains, determining what cybersecurity should be 
implemented turns on knowledge of one’s “assets” and 
“architecture.” 103  That is, what sensitive information do you have 
(e.g., customer lists of a client, sensitive trade secrets developed 
through substantial R&D expenditures, or potentially market-moving 
information about future business plans), and where do you store it 
(e.g., with a third-party cloud provider, on portable (and easily lost) 
external media like thumb drives, or on networks accessible by other 
practitioners in the firm without regard to whether the need access to 
such data). 104  This exercise will be relevant in respect to the 
arbitrator’s own practice-related data, such as conflicts and billing 
records, closed case records, as well as the data received in matters 
where the arbitrator is presiding. If the arbitrator works in an 
organizational setting, it will also be relevant in respect to the 
arbitrator’s use of personal devices, which are often not subject to  
                                                                                                             
APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204915 (last visited Jan. 22, 2017); Google Two-
Step Verification, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/landing/2step/ (last visited Jan. 22, 
2017); Seth Rosenblatt & Jason Cipriani, Two-Factor Authentication (What You Need to 
Know), CNET, (June 15, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/two-factor-authentication-what-
you-need-to-know-faq/. 
99. See Protections, How to Protect Your Computer, FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
100. See e.g., Alex Castle, How to Encrypt Almost Anything, PC WORLD, (Jan, 18, 
2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2025462/how-to-encrypt-almost-anything.html. 
101. Pastore, supra note 15. 
102. See supra note 99. 
103. In this article, we frequently refer synonymously to one’s digital “infrastructure.” 
104. Pastore, supra note 15. 
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established security protocols.105 
 
Once the arbitrator knows and classifies the sensitivity of the 
different data he or she holds and knows where it is located, the 
arbitrator will be in a position to assess what protocols may be 
appropriate for storage and transfer of the information.106 In addition, 
the arbitrator will be in a position to consider what steps can be taken 
to reduce the risk that sensitive data will be compromised in a 
cyberattack or following human error. For example: 
 Though the arbitrator may own both a tablet and laptop, do 
arbitration-related documents need to be accessible on both 
devices, or is it sufficient that they are loaded on one? (Here, 
an important consideration is whether the data really needs to 
be loaded onto a portable device and subjected to the 
enhanced risks of travel.) 
 Can the arbitrator enable notifications for e-mail107 or cloud 
services108 when unauthorized data access may have occurred 
and remotely revoke that access or wipe data? 
 When working at home, does the arbitrator use a separate 
device in lieu of a shared family computer? If not, are there 
other steps the arbitrator can take to segregate business data 
(e.g., by using separate computer logins)? 
By the same token, at the conclusion of a case, the arbitrator 
should seek to avoid holding onto case-related data longer than is 
                                                 
105. According to the ABA TechReport 2016, most lawyers (74%) use a personal rather 
than firm-issued phone for their legal work and a majority (51%) use a tablet for legal work, 
the vast majority of which (81%) are personal devices. Nonetheless, “only 43% of lawyers 
reported having a mobile technology policy for their firm, meaning the majority of law firms 
don’t even have a policy for how mobile devices should be used and how client data should be 
stored and transmitted on them.” Aaron Street, Mobile Technology, ABA TECHREPORT 
(2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/techreport/2016/mobile.html. 
106. Pastore discusses this analysis in greater detail. See Pastore supra note 15. 
107. Such measures are generally not available for free consumer e-mail services. Thus it 
is generally preferable to use paid professional versions of these services, which have more 
robust security protocols. 
108. Numerous lawyer ethics opinions have considered whether the use of cloud services 
is compatible with an attorney’s obligation to maintain confidentiality. The decisions generally 
have concluded that lawyers may use the services, provided that they take reasonable steps to 
select a reliable vendor, implement available security and address the potential risks. See 
Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resource
s/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html 
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necessary.109 With a view to developing an individualized document 
retention policy, the arbitrator should give thought to what 
information will be kept, why, for how long, where case information 
resides now (across which devices and in what 
applications/programs), and where the materials will be stored. At a 
minimum, the arbitrator will want to retain basic case administration 
data for the purposes of future conflicts checks. Otherwise, the 
arbitrator may wish to consider questions such as: 
 During the life of a case, can the arbitrator use file-naming 
conventions to facilitate identifying and segregating types of 
documents, such as pleadings and exhibits, that the arbitrator 
is unlikely to have any interest in retaining after a case ends? 
 Does applicable law preclude the arbitrator from retaining 
certain data or mandate that it be stored or disposed of in any 
particular fashion? 
 To the extent that it is desirable and appropriate to retain 
arbitrator work product, such as procedural orders and awards, 
for personal future reference, would it be workable to retain 
anonymized Word documents in lieu of final PDF copies? 
 If the arbitrator practices in an organizational setting that has a 
document retention policy, are documents kept longer than 
necessary to comply with rules applicable to the attorney-
client relationship, which do not apply to service as an 
arbitrator? 
 
D. Planning for a Data Breach 
Separate from considering data breach protocols for individual 
cases, there are a number of useful reasons for the arbitrator to 
consider more generally how he or she would respond to a data 
breach if and when one arises. First, by thinking through what steps 
should be taken in the event of various scenarios, the arbitrator may 
be able to identify and remediate security vulnerabilities that he or she 
had not considered. Second, the arbitrator will be in a better position 
to react quickly to control or limit the damage that flows from a 
security incident, and possibly avoid triggering duties to notify data 
owners, regulators, insurers, law enforcement, or others that a security 
                                                 
109. Pastore, supra note 15. 
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incident occurred. 110  This exercise is particularly important for 
international arbitrators for whom international travel is a fact of life, 
as travel creates special risks of inadvertent data loss and vulnerability 
to unlawful intrusion. 
The prospect of a lost laptop, for example, may prompt an 
arbitrator to consider: 
 Is the laptop protected by a strong password? 
 Is full disk encryption enabled?111 
 Can the arbitrator make use of location tracking and/or remote 
data wiping to minimize potential disclosure of sensitive 
information?112 
 Can the arbitrator provide the police with the serial number for 
the laptop? 
 Can the arbitrator avoid lost productivity by restoring 
information on the laptop from a back-up? 
 Is there sensitive data on the laptop that could trigger breach 
notification duties? If so, could that data be handled 
differently (e.g., securely destroyed or encrypted)? 
E. Case Management Considerations 
In our view, the arbitrator must be attuned to data security issues 
in the organizing phase of the arbitration. Taking into account such 
                                                 
110. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Guidance Regarding 
Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/#_edn1 (last accessed Jan. 21, 2017) 
(explaining that there is often a safe harbor for data breach notification if sensitive information 
has been encrypted or otherwise de-sensitized); Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General 
California, Department of Justice, Breach Report 2016, available at 
https://oag.ca.gov/breachreport2016 (last accessed Jan. 21, 2017) (explaining major 
differences between state notification statutes); See Cal. Civil Code § 1798.82 (demonstrating 
that in 2016, California amended its data breach notification law effective January 1, 2017 to 
trigger notification obligations not only if unencrypted data is compromised, but also if 
encrypted data is breached along with any encryption key that could render the data readable 
or useable).  
111. See Turn On Full Disk Encryption (Windows 10), MICROSOFT, 
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/instantanswers/e7d75dd2-29c2-16ac-f03d-
20cfdf54202f/turn-on-device-encryption; see also Use FileVault to Encrypt the Start-Up Disk 
on Your MAC, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204837. 
112. These measures are available for Apple devices including laptops, for example, but 
only if the “find my iPhone” feature has been activated first. 
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factors as the size and complexity of the case, the likelihood that 
confidential or sensitive data will be stored or transmitted, the parties’ 
resources, sophistication, and preferences, as well as potential legal 
obligations arising under applicable law or rules in relation to data 
privacy or confidentiality, the arbitrator should consider whether to 
raise the topic of data security at the initial case management or 
procedural conference. 113  Thereafter, the continuing scope of the 
arbitrator’s duty will depend on factors such as the extent to which the 
parties or their counsel assume responsibility for data security and the 
arbitrator’s own assessment of the ongoing risks and the measures he 
or she can reasonably implement in addition to or in lieu of measures 
other actors are undertaking. 
The arbitrator may also seek the cooperation of the parties and 
counsel in avoiding the unnecessary transmission of sensitive data to 
the tribunal. For example, at the outset of an arbitration, the arbitrator 
may consider telling counsel that, apart from reliance documents 
submitted with the parties’ memorials, the arbitrator is not to be 
copied on, or provided with, any pre-hearing disclosure that the 
parties may otherwise exchange. Likewise, if the arbitrator can 
anticipate that sensitive personal information (such as tax returns) or 
commercial information (such as pricing information or trade secrets) 
will be exchanged, consideration may be given to having irrelevant 
information redacted (e.g., to show only the last four digits of a social 
security number). Alternatively, it may be possible to aggregate or 
anonymize data before it is provided to the arbitrator without 
diminishing either party’s ability to fairly present its case. 
VI. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
We conclude this article with the well-worn maxim that “it takes 
a village.” We hope that the challenge we present to arbitrators will 
stimulate discussion in the international commercial arbitration 
community and prompt other participants to focus on their own 
responsibilities and how their individual security architecture and 
practices may undermine or support the security measures taken by 
                                                 
113. See UNCITRAL Notes, supra note 26. Consistent with the 2016 UNCITRAL Notes 
on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, we do not intend to suggest a binding requirement for the 
tribunal or parties to act in any particular manner.  
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others. As awareness of cybersecurity risks in arbitration increases, 
we hope to see dialogue around questions such as the following: 
 Should arbitral institutions amend their rules to flag data 
security for consideration in the initial organizing phase of 
an arbitration, as their rules now do with respect to other 
important topics,114 and/or should they expressly establish 
duties for the parties, counsel, institution and arbitrators to 
implement reasonable measures to avoid intrusion? 
 Should counsel be charged with developing a data security 
plan in individual arbitration matters115 and/or providing a 
secure platform for the transmission and storage of data in 
each matter? 
 How should tribunals resolve party conflicts about 
appropriate security measures, breach notification 
obligations, and related costs? 
 Should arbitrators routinely disclose their data security 
practices to parties and counsel (e.g., in relation to cloud 
computing or post-award document retention) and should 
those practices be subject to the parties’ comments and 
consent? 
 Should arbitral institutions or other participants develop 
shared secured platforms for data storage and transmission 
that would be available to parties as a non-exclusive choice? 
 What kinds of training and education programs should be 
developed for parties, counsel, arbitrators, and other 
participants to provide baseline knowledge, as well as 
updated information on evolving data security threats and 
updates on available protective measures? 
                                                 
114. See e.g., ICC RULES, supra note 10, at art. 22, (effective case management) and 
Appendix IV (case management techniques); ICDR RULES, supra note 10, at art. 20(2) (noting 
that the tribunal and the parties may consider how technology, including electronic 
communications, could be used to increase the efficiency and economy of the proceedings) 
and art. 20(7) (establishing the parties’ duty to avoid unnecessary delay and expense and the 
tribunal’s power to “allocate costs, draw adverse inferences, and take such additional steps as 
are necessary to protect the efficiency and integrity of the arbitration”); LCIA RULES, supra 
note 1, at art. 14 (avoiding unnecessary delay and expense) and art. 30 (confidentiality). 
115. See David J. Kessler, et al., Protective Orders in the Age of Hacking, NYLJ, (Mar. 
16, 2015), reprint at 1 (“In the age of cyber attacks, hacking, and digital corporate espionage… 
[p]rotective orders should be upgraded to require reasonable levels of security to protect an 
opponents’ data and more stringent notification requirements if unauthorized access does 
occur . . .”). 
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 Should institutions that maintain rosters of arbitrators 
require their arbitrators to complete mandatory 
cybersecurity training? 
 Should arbitrator ethical codes be updated to define 
competence to include an obligation to keep abreast of new 
developments in arbitration and its practice, and to consider 
the benefits and risks associated with technology? 
 Should professional organizations like the International Bar 
Association or the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators develop 
cybersecurity checklists or guidance notes for arbitrators, 
counsel, or other participants? 
There will no right answer to these and other relevant questions, 
but we are confident that dialogue will be constructive. What will 
constitute a reasonable data security program and what reasonable 
measures individual participants in the process should take will 
continue to evolve. Our hope is that increased awareness will ensure 
that a process will emerge in every arbitration to identify data security 
risks and develop a response, having regard to the nature and scope of 
the risks, the desires and resources of the parties, and other relevant 
factors. 
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